Towards a Computationally Viable Framework for Semantic Representation

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Outline

Classical Approaches to Semantic Representation

A Representability Problem with Worlds

An Operational Characterisation of Intensions

A Probabilistic Account of Modality and Epistemic Reasoning

Conclusions and Future Work
Possible Worlds in Formal Semantics

- Since Montague (1974) a mainstream view among formal semanticists has depended on possible worlds to model the meanings of natural language expressions.
- Montague imported possible worlds into his model theory through his use of Kripke frame semantics (Kripke(1959,1963)) for modal logic.
- This approach is anticipated in Carnap’s (1947) characterisation of intensions as functions from state descriptions to extensions.
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Possible Worlds in Epistemic Reasoning

- Kripke frame semantics has also been influential in the related field of epistemic reasoning (Halperin (1995)).
- More recent formal semantic approaches, such as Dynamic semantics (Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990, 1991)), and Inquisitive Semantics (Ciardelli, Groenendijk, and Roelofsen (2013), Ciardelli, Roelofsen, and Theiler (2017)) use possible worlds to incorporate epistemic elements into formal semantics.
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Kripke Frame Semantics

- A model $M = \langle D, W, F, R \rangle$, where $D$ is a non-empty set of individuals, $W$ is a non-empty set of worlds, $F$ is an interpretation function that assigns intensions to the constants of a language, and $R$ is an accessibility relation on $W$.

- Formal semanticists have expanded $M$ to include additional indices representing elements of context, such as sets of points in time, and sets of speakers.

- The elements of $W$ are points at which a maximal consistent set of propositions are satisfied.

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**Worlds as Ultrafilters of Propositions**

- There is a one to one correspondence between the elements of $W$ and the elements of the set of maximal consistent sets of propositions.
- Fox et al. (2002), Fox and Lappin (2005), and Pollard (2008) use this correspondence to formally represent worlds as the set $U$ of ultrafilters in the prelattice of propositions.
- A proposition $p$ holds at a world $w_i$ iff $p \in u_i$, where $u_i \in U$.
- The question of how to represent $W$ reduces to the representability of $U$. 
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A Simplified Version of the Representation Problem

- Assume that the prelattice on which the elements of $U$ are defined encodes classical Boolean propositional logic.
- This system is complete and decidable, and so minimal in expressive power.
- To identify any $u_i \in U$ we need to specify all and only the propositions that hold at $u_i$ (an infinite set of propositions).
- We can enumerate the elements of an infinite set if there is an effective procedure (a finite set of rules, an algorithm, a recursive definition, etc.) for recognising its members.
- It is not clear what an effective procedure for enumerating the propositions of $u_i$ would consist in.
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The Representation of a World as a SAT Problem

• Simplifying further, assume that we are able to generate $u_i$ from a finite set $P_{u_i}$ of propositions, all of which are in Conjunction Normal Form (CNF).

• A proposition in CNF is a conjunction of disjunctions of literals (elementary propositional variables or their negations).

• The propositions in $P_{u_i}$ can be conjoined in a single formula $p_{u_i}$ that is itself in CNF.

• For $p_{u_i}$ to hold it is necessary to determine a distribution of truth-values for its literals that renders the entire formula true.
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The Complexity of the SAT Problem

- Determining the complexity of this satisfaction problem is an instance of the $k$SAT problem, where $k$ is the number of literals in $p_{u_i}$.
- If $3 \leq k$, then the satisfiability problem for $p_{u_i}$ is, in the general case, NP-complete, and so intractable (Papadimitriou (1995)).
- Given that this formula is intended to express the finite core of propositions from which the entire ultrafilter $u_i$ is derived, it is reasonable to allow it to contain a large number of distinct elementary propositional constituents, each corresponding to a "core" fact that holds in $u_i$. 
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The Intractability of the Representation Problem

- It will also be necessary to include law like statements expressing regular relations among events that hold in a world (such as the laws of physics).
- These will be expressed as conditionals \( A \rightarrow B \), which are encoded in a CNF formula by disjunctions of the form \( \neg A \lor B \).
- Even given the generous simplifying assumptions concerning the enumeration of \( u_i \), specifying the ultrafilter of propositions that corresponds to an individual world is, in general, a computationally intractable problem.
- It follows that it is not possible to compute \( W \) efficiently.
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Three Possible Escape Moves which Do Not Work: Move 1

- We could follow Montague in claiming that formal semantics is a branch of mathematics rather than psychology.
- Questions of efficient computability and representability are not relevant to the theoretical constructions that it employs.
- This move raises the obvious question of what formal semantics is explaining.
- If it seeks to account for the way in which people interpret the expressions of a natural language, then one cannot simply discard the cognitive aspect of meaning.
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A Weaker Version of Move 1

- We could acknowledge that using and interpreting natural language is indeed a cognitive process, but invoke the competence-performance distinction to insulate formal semantic theory from computational and processing concerns.

- On this view formal semantics offers a theory of semantic competence, which underlies speakers’ linguistic performance.

- Unless one provides an explicit account of the way in which this competence drives processing and behaviour, then the notion of competence remains devoid of explanatory content (Lau, Clark, and Lappin (2016)).

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Move 2: Stratification

- This technique stratifies a class of intractable problems into subclasses in order to identify the largest subsets of tractable tasks within the larger set (Clark and Lappin (2011)).
- So, for example, work on the tractable subclasses of $k$SAT problems is an active area of research.
- Similarly, first-order logic is undecidable, but many efficient theorem provers have been developed for subsets of first-order logic that are tractably decidable.
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Why Stratification won’t Work for The World Representation Problem

- By definition, a world is (corresponds to) a maximal set of consistent propositions, an ultrafilter in a prelattice.
- If we specify only a proper subset of such an ultrafilter (a non-maximal filter), then it is no longer identified by all and only the propositions that hold at that world.
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Move 3: Possible Situations

- We could substitute the set of possible situations for the set of possible worlds, where situations are partial worlds (Heim (1990), Lappin (2000), Kratzer (2014)).
- It is indeed the case that some non-maximal individual situations, and certain sets of such situations are easier to represent than worlds (Barwise and Perry (1983)).
- However, the representability problem for the entire set of possible situations is even more severe than the one that we encounter for the set of possible worlds.
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The Representability Problem for the Set of Possible Situations

- For any given $u_i$ corresponding to a world $w_i$, a situation $s_i \subseteq u_i$.
- The set of situations $S_i$ for $u_i$ is $\mathcal{P}(u_i)$, the power set of $u_i$.
- If $|u_i| = \aleph_0$, by Cantor’s theorem on the cardinality of power sets, $|S_i|$ is uncountably infinite.
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It is possible to avoid this difficulty if we limit ourselves to subsets of situations that we can specify effectively, as we require them for particular analyses.

This is, in effect, a form of stratification.

But as situations are not maximal in the way that worlds are, it is a viable method when applied to situations.

In order for stratification to work, it is necessary to show that we do, in fact, have effective procedures for representing the situations that we need for our theories.
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Operational and Denotational Semantics of Programming Languages

- It is common to distinguish between the operational and the denotational semantics of a program (Stump (2013)).
- Operational meaning corresponds (roughly) to the sequence of state transitions that occur when a program is executed.
- It can be identified with the computational process through which the program produces an output for a specified input.
- The denotational meaning of a program is the mathematical object that represents the output which it generates for a given input.
- Operational and denotational semantics can be understood compositionally in terms of their contributions to the state transitions of the program, and the value that it yields, respectively.
Operational and Denotational Semantics of Programming Languages

- It is common to distinguish between the operational and the denotational semantics of a program (Stump (2013)).
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Example 1

- It is possible to construct a theorem prover for first-order logic using either semantic tableaux or resolution (Blackburn and Bos (2003)).
- Both theorem provers use proof by contradiction, but they employ alternative formal methods, and they are implemented as different computational procedures.
- They exhibit distinct efficiency and complexity properties.
- The two classifier predicates $\text{theorem}_{\text{tableaux}}$ and $\text{theorem}_{\text{resolution}}$ are operationally distinct, but they are provably equivalent in their denotations.
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Example 2

• Consider two functions from fundamental sound frequencies to the letters indicating musical notes and half tones.

• The first takes as its arguments the pitch frequency waves of the electronic sensor in a chromatic tuner, and the second the pitch frequency graphs of a spectrogram.

• Assume that both functions can recognise notes and half tones in the same range of octaves, to the same level of accuracy.

• Again, their operational semantics are distinct, but they are denotationally equivalent.
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An Operational View of Intensions

- We take the operational meaning of an expression to be the computational process through which speakers compute its extension.
- Its denotational meaning is the extension that it generates for a given argument.
- Intensions are computable functions.
- This view of intension avoids the intractability of representation problem that arises with possible worlds.
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The Problem of Hyperintensionality

If logically equivalent expressions have the same denotations in all possible worlds and intensions are functions from worlds to denotations, then these expressions are identical in intension.

(1) a. If $A \subseteq B$ and $B \subseteq A$, then $A = B$. ⇔
b. A prime number is divisible only by itself and 1.

(2) a. Mary believes that if $A \subseteq B$ and $B \subseteq A$, then $A = B$. ⇔
b. Mary believes that a prime number is divisible only by itself and 1.
An Operational Solution to Hyperintensionality

- If we identify intensions with operational meaning, then (1)a and b are intensionally distinct.
- (1)a is a theorem of set theory, while (1)b is a theorem of number theory.
- Their proofs are entirely different, and so they encode distinct objects of belief.
- The operational notion of intension permits us to individuate objects of propositional attitude with the necessary degree of fine-grained meaning.
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Modality

(3) a. Necessarily if $A \subseteq B$ and $B \subseteq A$, then $A = B$.

b. Possibly interest rates will rise in the next quarter.

c. It is likely that the Social Democrats will win the next election in Sweden.
The Classical View

- In possible worlds semantics modal operators are generalised quantifiers (GQs) on worlds.
- Necessity is a universal quantifier.
- Possibility an existential quantifier.
- Likely is a variant of the second-order GQ most.
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Classical Truth Conditions for Modal Statements

1. \(\Box\alpha|^{M,w_i} = t \iff \forall w \in W |\alpha|^{M,w} = t.\)

2. \(\Diamond\beta|^{M,w_i} = t \iff \exists w \in W |\beta|^{M,w} = t.\)

3. \(\text{Likely } \gamma|^{M,w_i} = t \iff \text{for an appropriately defined } W' \subseteq W, \) \(\{|w_j \in W' : |\gamma|^{M,w_j} = t| \geq \epsilon, \text{ where } \epsilon \text{ is a parametric cardinality value that is greater than 50% of } W'\).\)
An Alternative Probabilistic View of Modality

- We can reformulate modal statements as types of probability judgments.
- A probability model $M$ consists of a sample space of events with all possible outcomes given, and a probability distribution over these outcomes, specified by a function $p$ (Halpern (2003)).
- A model of the throws of a die assigns probabilities to each of its six sides landing up.
- If the die is not biased towards one or more sides, the probability function will assign equal probability to each of these outcomes, with the values of the sides summing to 1.
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Worlds and Sample Spaces

- Probability theorists often refer to the set of possible outcomes in a sample space as possible worlds, but this is misleading.
- Unlike worlds in Kripke frame semantics, outcomes are non-maximal.
- They are more naturally described as situations, which can be as large or as small as required by the sample space of a model.
- In specifying a sample space it is not necessary to distribute probability over the set of all possible situations (even of a certain type).
- We estimate the likelihood of an event of a particular type on the basis of observed occurrences of events, either of this type, or of others that might condition it.
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Bayesian Probability

• In Bayesian models we compute the posterior probability of an event $A$ (the hypothesis) given observed events $B$ (the evidence) with Bayes’ Rule, where $p(B) \neq 0$.

\[ p(A|B) = \frac{p(B|A)p(A)}{p(B)} \]

• $p(A)$ is the prior probability that the model assigns to the hypothesis that $A$ will occur, and the denominator $p(B)$ normalises the value of the numerator so that all probabilities in the sample space sum to 1.
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Conditional Probability

- Assume that the probability of $A$ is conditioned by several event types $V_1, \ldots, V_k$, where these are random variables.
- Each such $V_i$ contains a set of probability assignments for different outcomes with respect to an event of that type.
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An Example

- Let $A$ be the event of John arriving home on time.
  - Let the random variables that $A$ depends on be whether his meeting ends on time ($T$), if he leaves work immediately after the meeting ($W$), and whether his bus is running on schedule ($B$).
  - Assume that $T$ includes probabilities for John’s meeting ending on time ($t_1$), for the meeting ending late ($t_2$), and for it ending early ($t_3$).
  - If these are the only event instances for the random variable $T$, then $p(t_1) + p(t_2) + p(t_3) = 1$.
  - The other random variables, $W$ and $B$, have similar distributions of probability values for their instances.
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Marginalising out Conditional Probabilities

- We can compute a non-conditional probability for $A$ by marginalising out the probabilities of $T, W, B$.
- This involves summing across the joint probability values for $A$ and all instances of the random variables $T, W, B$.
- $p(A) = \sum_{t \in T, w \in W, b \in B} p(A, t, w, b)$
- Joint probabilities of this kind are equivalent to the probabilities of a conjunction of events, and we can compute these through the chain rule for conjunction, which treats it as a product of conditional probabilities.
- $p(A, T, W, B) = p(A|T, W, B) \times p(T|W, B) \times p(W|B) \times p(B)$
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Tractability of the Representation Problem for Bayesian Probability Models

- Computing the full set of such joint probability assignments is, in the general case, intractable.
- However, there are efficient ways of estimating or approximating them within a Bayesian network (Pearl (1990), Murphy (2001), Halpern (2003), Koski and Noble (2009)).
- It is, then, possible to efficiently represent a large subset of probability models, and to compute probability distributions for the possible events in their sample spaces.
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Using Probability Models to Characterise Modality

Let $M$ be a probability model, and $p$ the probability function in $M$.

1'. $\|\text{Necessarily } \alpha\|_{M,p} = t$ iff for all models $M' \in R, p_{\in M'}(\alpha) = 1$, where $R$ is a suitably restricted subset of probability models.

2'. $\|\text{Possibly } \beta\|_{M,p} = t$ iff $p(\beta) > 0$.

3'. $\|\text{Likely } \gamma\|_{M,p} = t$ iff $p(\gamma) > \epsilon$, where $\epsilon$ is a parametric probability value that is greater than 0.5.
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Epistemic States: the Classical Approach

- Let $W_B$ be the set of worlds (understood as ultrafilters of propositions) compatible with an agent $a$’s beliefs.
- Take $F_B$ to be a possibly non-maximal filter such that $F_B \subseteq \bigcap W_B$, where for every proposition $\phi \in F_B$, $a$ regards $\phi$ as true.
- Let $w_{\text{actual}}$ be the actual world.
- $a$’s knowledge is contained in $F_K \subseteq F_B \cap w_{\text{actual}}$ (Halperin (1995)).
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Epistemic States: a Probabilistic Approach

- We can use a probability model to encode an agent’s beliefs.
- The probability distribution that this model contains expresses the agent’s epistemic commitments concerning the likelihood of situations and events.
- One way of articulating the structure of causal dependencies implicit in these beliefs is to use a Bayesian network as a model of belief.
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Bayesian Networks

- A Bayesian network is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) whose nodes are random variables.
- Each of the values of a random variable is the probability of one of the set of possible states that the variable denotes.
- Its directed edges express dependency relations among the variables.
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A Bayesian Network (Russell and Norvig (1995))

- **P(C=F) P(C=T)**
  - 0.5 0.5

- **P(R=F) P(R=T)**
  - F: 0.8 0.2
  - T: 0.2 0.8

- **P(W=F) P(W=T)**
  - FF: 1.0 0.0
  - TF: 0.1 0.9
  - FT: 0.1 0.9
  - TT: 0.01 0.99

- **Table for Cloudy**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C</th>
<th>P(S=F)</th>
<th>P(S=T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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</tr>
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<td>T</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
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</table>

- **Diagram**
  - Cloudy
  - Sprinkler
  - Rain
  - Wet Grass
Computing the Unconditional Probability of an Event in a Bayesian Network

- We can compute the marginal probability of the grass being wet \((W = T)\) in this network by marginalising out the probabilities of the other variables on which \(W\) conditionally depends.
- As we have seen, this involves summing across all the joint probabilities of their instances.
- \(p(W = T) = \sum_{s, r, c} p(W = T, S = s, R = r, C = c)\)
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Modelling an Agent’s Belief with Bayesian Networks

• In principle we could model an agent’s beliefs as a single integrated Bayesian network.

• This would be inefficient, as it would be problematic to determine the dependencies among all of the random variables representing event types that the agent has beliefs about, in a way that sustains consistency and tractability.

• It is more computationally manageable, and more epistemically plausible to construct local Bayesian networks to encode an agent’s a’s beliefs about a particular domain of situations.

• A complete collection of beliefs for a will consist of a set of such local networks, where each element of this set expresses a’s beliefs about a specified class of events.
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- Two graphs $G_i$ and $G_j$ are *isomorphic* iff
  
  1. they contain the same number of vertices,
  2. there is a bijection from the vertices of $G_i$ to the vertices of $G_j$ and vice versa, such that
  3. the same number of edges connect each vertex $v_i$ to $G_i$ and $v_j$ to $G_j$, through identical corresponding paths.

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Knowledge and Belief

- Two subgraphs of two Bayesian networks match iff they are isomorphic, and the random variables at their corresponding vertices range over the same event instances, with the same probability values.
- Let $BN_B$ be the Bayesian network that expresses a’s beliefs about a given event domain.
- Take $BN_R$ to be the Bayesian network that codifies the actual probabilities and causal dependencies that hold for these events.
- We can identify a’s knowledge for this domain as the maximal subgraph $BN_K$ of $BN_B$ that matches a subgraph in $BN_R$, and which satisfies additional conditions $C$.
- These conditions enforce constraints like the requirement that the beliefs encoded in $BN_B$ are warranted by appropriate evidence.
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Related Work: van Eijck and Lappin (2012)

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- It is not entirely clear how probabilities for sentences are computed in this system.
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• The tradition of formal semantics which uses possible worlds to model intensions, modality, and epistemic states is not built on cognitively viable foundations.

• By adapting the distinction between operational and denotation semantics to natural language it is possible to develop a fine-grained treatment of intensions that dispenses with possible worlds.

• We use probability models to interpret modal expressions, and Bayesian networks to encode knowledge, belief, and inference.

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- It must explain how intensions are acquired by Bayesian learning processes.
- It must develop a wide coverage system that combines a compositional semantics with a procedure for generating probability models in which it is possible to sample a large number of predicates.
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